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Abstract
Against the background of a sense of crisis in the European Union and in international politics, 
European Union Member States have since 2016 increased their cooperation within the 
Common Security and Defence Policy, for example, establishing the European Defence Fund. 
Scholars have long pointed out that the European Union lacks the necessary ‘hard’ military 
power to influence international politics, subscribing to and constituting an image of the 
European Union as not masculine enough. We are critical of these accounts and develop a 
different argument. First, building on insights from feminist security and critical military studies, 
we argue that the European Union is a military power constituted by multiple masculinities. 
We consider the European Union to be a masculine military power, not only because it uses 
and aims to develop military instruments, but also because of how militarism and military 
masculinities permeate discourses, practices and policies within Common Security and Defence 
Policy and the European Union more broadly. We argue, second, that the crisis narrative allows 
the European Union to strengthen Common Security and Defence Policy and exhibit more 
aggressive military masculinities based on combat, which exist alongside entrepreneurial and 
protector masculinities. These developments do not indicate a clear militarisation of Common 
Security and Defence Policy, but, rather, an advancement and normalisation of militarism and 
the militarised masculinities associated with it.
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Introduction
In her foreword to the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union, High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European 
Commission (HRVSP), Federica Mogherini, proclaimed that the European Union’s (EU) 
‘wider region has become more unstable and more insecure’ (EU, 2016: 3). Developments 
in and around Europe, such as US President Donald Trump’s critique of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), the so-called migration crisis at Europe’s Southern borders, 
a supposedly resurgent Russia in the East, and questions about the EU’s military capabili-
ties after Brexit, have all created a sense of crisis that seems to challenge the EU’s role as 
an international actor. At the same time, these ‘times of crisis’ have prompted a variety of 
new policy instruments in EU security and defence, among them the establishment of a 
European Defence Fund (EDF) (European Commission, 2019) and the launch of the pro-
cess of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) (European External Action Service 
(EEAS), 2018a). European leaders have also expressed increased support for a more asser-
tive EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), with German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron calling for a ‘real’ EU army.
Some scholars have been quick to emphasise that these developments will not change 
the intergovernmental approach of CSDP (cf. Heisbourg, 2016). Others consider them 
evidence of a significant relaunch of the EU’s security and defence project (cf. Howorth, 
2017). Many EU studies scholars have welcomed the EU’s latest efforts in defence, as 
these suggest that the EU is stepping up its role in international affairs at last. For exam-
ple, in his foreword to a paper on PESCO, former Director of the European Union Institute 
for Security Studies (EUISS) Antonio Missiroli (2017: 5) pointed out that:
the speed and determination with which the EU and its member states have (re)engaged on 
defence cooperation – well beyond the Common Security and Defence Policy proper – prove 
that Europeans are now becoming well aware of what it at stake in a rapidly mutating security 
environment.
Missiroli writes that ‘for someone who has been in this business for 20 years [. . .], all this 
is no minor source of relief – even rejoicing’. Sven Biscop (2016: 431) stresses that 
against the background of mounting security challenges, the EU Global Strategy ‘does 
not come a moment too soon’. Similarly, Hylke Dijkstra (2016: 369) finds that ‘encircled 
by security crises, it is difficult to think of something more important than collective 
action with the aim of weathering the storm’. The Global Strategy ‘gets the diagnosis 
right’ (Dijkstra, 2016: 371).
As Christopher Bickerton (2010: 214) points out, the study of CSDP has been charac-
terised by a prescriptive concern with the EU’s ability to act in the world. Underpinning 
much of CSDP research is the question of why the EU fails to realise its potential in inter-
national affairs and how it can become a more effective or ‘serious’ (meaning, military) 
actor (cf. Allen and Smith, 1990; Hill, 1993). This prescriptive concern has influenced 
well-known debates in EU studies about the EU’s ability to act in the absence of common 
military capabilities. As part of these debates, some scholars have openly critiqued, or 
even ridiculed, the EU’s lack of ‘hard’ military power and its ability to influence interna-
tional politics (Kagan, 2002), whereas others have emphasised the specific character of 
the EU as an international actor, and put forward that even without an army the EU makes 
a difference by means of its market power (Damro, 2012), its normative ability to ‘lead 
by example’ (Manners, 2002; Sjursen, 2006), or a combination of both (Holland, 1995). 
Hoijtink and Muehlenhoff 3
Indeed, those scholars who have insisted on a presumably distinct ‘civilian’ (Duchêne, 
1972) or ‘normative’ (Manners, 2002) identity of the EU have argued that the absence of 
military capabilities should be seen as a virtue rather than as a sign of weakness.
Within research on CSDP and the EU’s role in international security more broadly, 
most authors then concur that the EU lacks effective military means and that it is a small 
military power at best, thereby either constituting an image of the EU as impotent and not 
masculine enough or subscribing to the idea that the EU is a different kind of power that, 
even if it deploys military force, is less defined by its military capacity. What has been 
absent from the literature, with the exception of the work of Annica Kronsell (2016a, 
2016b), is an explicit engagement with how the EU exhibits military masculinities and is 
constituted as a masculine military power. To address this gap in the literature, our article 
asks how militarism and military masculinities are inscribed in CSDP, particularly in the 
aftermath of the recent so-called times of crisis. We focus on CSDP because, while mili-
tary masculinities increasingly circulate in EU policies beyond CSDP, this is where they 
are found most explicitly.
Our argument is twofold. First, building on insights from feminist security and critical 
military studies on the relationship between war, militarism, and gender, we argue that the 
EU as an international security actor is constituted by multiple military masculinities. We 
draw on feminist work that has foregrounded the notion of ‘militarism’, defined by 
Stavrianakis and Selby (2012: 3) as ‘the social and international relations of the prepara-
tion for, and conduct of, organised political violence’. This allows us to move beyond an 
understanding of military power as related to the (in)ability to engage in military conduct 
or the military capabilities international actors have or have not, towards an analysis of 
how military power and military masculinities are inscribed in CSDP discourse and prac-
tices. In so doing, we consider the EU to be a masculine military power, not only because 
it uses and aims to develop ‘hard’ military instruments, but also because of the ways in 
which militarism permeates political and social relations, discourses and practices – all of 
them also highly gendered – at the EU.
We argue, second, that while the current crisis narrative allows the EU to strengthen 
CSDP and exhibit more aggressive combat masculinities, such developments suggest 
continuity rather than abrupt change. What we see today is not a clear militarisation of 
CSDP – as if it was not already shaped by military discourses, strategies and technologies 
– but rather an advancement and normalisation of militarism and the militarised mascu-
linities associated with it. We find that within CSDP more aggressive combat masculini-
ties have come to exist alongside entrepreneurial and protector masculinity (Kronsell, 
2016a, 2016b).
To study the specific form that EU militarism and military masculinities take in the 
context of crisis, we conduct a feminist discursive analysis of policy initiatives linked to 
CSDP (from the launch of the 2016 Global Strategy onwards), including the Battlegroups, 
PESCO, EDF, military operation Sophia and the European Peace Facility (EPF). We use 
official documents, speeches, reports, secondary sources, webpages, images and EU pro-
motional material to study the production and legitimation of militarism and military 
masculinities within CSDP. While webpages, images and promotional material generally 
articulate militarism and binary constructions around masculine and feminine identities 
‘more clearly than official documents’ (Kronsell, 2016b: 314), we contend that the ways 
in which these articulations are incorporated into formal and technical reports are just as 
important. Our argument proceeds in three steps. We first analyse academic debates on 
EU security and defence and call for a focus on militarism and military masculinities. 
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Next, we draw on feminist scholarship in International Relations (IR) to introduce the 
concepts of military/hegemonic masculinity and their relevance for analysing CSDP. 
Third, we conduct a discourse analysis of key reports, policy documents and speeches on 
CSDP since 2016 to study how these sources invoke a particular sense of crisis and nor-
malise military masculinities.
Perspectives on CSDP and EU Military Power
The rapid development of European security and defence cooperation since the concep-
tion of CSDP in 2003 has gone hand in hand with a growing interest in the study of CSDP. 
Initially, research on CSDP has focused on explaining its emergence and the question of 
why Member States have, at least in principle, agreed to partly surrender a key part of 
their state sovereignty. For some, CSDP represents the final step in a natural process of 
integration predicted by neo-functionalism (cf. Smith, 2004), whereas others have offered 
a realist explanation, focusing on Europe’s failure to respond to the Balkan wars or its 
motivation to balance US unipolarity, particularly in the context of the 2003 Iraq War (cf. 
Posen, 2006). Again others have argued that CSDP follows a more complex trajectory 
characterised by ‘a series of haphazard, creative and combinatorial operations carried out 
by a small group of policymakers’, or ‘bricolage’ (Mérand, 2012: 136).
The increasing scope of CSDP missions coupled with notable institutional develop-
ments in Brussels has given rise to a second generation of CSDP research on policy 
implementation. Scholars have focused on the complexity of decision-making and deci-
sion-shaping in CSDP (Howorth, 2012), the role of EU-level actors, institutions, and 
transnational expert communities in decision-shaping (Cross, 2011; Juncos and 
Reynolds, 2007), the EU’s interaction with other actors in international security, NATO 
in particular (Hofmann, 2011), and the varied nature of operations conducted under 
CSDP (Gross and Juncos, 2011).
Despite the richness of the broader CSDP research agenda, we observe together with 
others (Bickerton, 2010; Kurowska, 2012; Mälksoo, 2016; Merlingen, 2011) that much of 
the literature on CSDP has been characterised by a focus on effectiveness and policy 
output. According to Xymena Kurowska (2012: 2), ‘[w]ithin CSDP, the bulk of criticism 
focuses on the discrepancy between European Union (EU) rhetoric and implementation, 
or it examines inconsistencies within the policy itself’. She finds that there is ‘a certain 
under-representation of critical voices in the domain of CSDP’, especially when com-
pared with research on EU involvement in other security areas, such as counterterrorism 
(De Goede, 2008) and migration and border management (Jeandesboz, 2016; Léonard, 
2010; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015). A key contribution of this literature is that it moves away 
from a focus on the EU’s effectiveness in security, towards a study of the discursive prac-
tices that constitute and legitimise the EU’s role in security in the first place. This has led 
to a fundamentally reflexive debate about how EU policies themselves produce insecurity 
and constitute an ongoing process of ‘securitisation’ within areas such as migration and 
border control (Huysmans, 2006; Neal, 2009). In addition, some scholars have pointed 
out how securitisation relies on and reproduces gendered and racialised discourses and 
practices (Stachowitsch and Sachseder, 2019).
Our article not only builds on these insights and links them to the study of CSDP but 
also extends them by examining expressions of military force inscribed in EU discourse, 
practice and policy, and by explicitly foregrounding the question of how the EU is consti-
tuted and legitimised as a masculine military power. Both the literature on CSDP and 
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critical security studies have refrained from engaging with this question. The former 
because it has considered the EU to be a de-masculinised power or small military power 
at best; critical security studies because from its very conception it has sought to move 
away from what it considered to be an excessive focus on military power, state-centrism 
and aggression within (neo)realism and strategic studies (Stavrianakis and Stern, 2018). 
Yet, drawing on the concept of militarism as discussed within feminist and critical mili-
tary studies, we contend that the way in which military power operates is not solely 
through aggressive practices of combat masculinity or the actual and effective engage-
ment in military conduct. Neither does it operate distinct from, or in opposition to, secu-
rity. Instead, military power ‘is often justified by reference to security’ and enacted by 
discourses and practices at multiple scales, from the global to the everyday (Wibben, 
2018: 138). For instance, Victoria Basham (2018: 40) points out how what she calls ‘lib-
eral militarism’ – the use of military force by liberal states to intervene in non-liberal 
states with the aim to ‘fix’ them – is made possible in everyday practices and relations, for 
example, by waving ‘flags at military and monarchical parades’, as much as in formal 
practices of foreign policy.
From this perspective, we can see how the EU operates as a military power in the sense 
that it is committed to maintaining, using and developing military force and capabilities 
in the name of security, even if the majority of its operations are said to be of a ‘civilian’ 
nature and ‘do not involve military forces at all’ (Smith, 2017: 10). In addition, a focus on 
militarism allows us to study how military power and the everyday are connected through 
masculinities that dominate militaries but also permeate the civilian sphere and everyday 
life. The next section elaborates on how militarism relies on and reproduces hierarchies 
of masculinities and femininities.
Centring Militarism and Masculinities
Although there is a rich body of scholarship defined by feminist security studies within 
IR, the study of the EU and its external relations has been remarkably ignorant of these 
contributions. Only recently, scholars have begun to interrogate the EU’s role in the 
world, including its security and defence policy, from a feminist perspective. Most of this 
work takes the EU’s implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and its follow-up resolutions as a starting 
point (Guerrina and Wright, 2016; Muehlenhoff, 2017). The majority of this work 
employs a feminist institutionalist approach to analyse how EU institutions such as the 
EEAS are gendered. For example, Roberta Guerrina et al. (2018) argue that CSDP lacks 
strong ‘velvet triangles’, consisting of ‘femocrats’ (feminist bureaucrats), organised civil 
society and epistemic communities, pushing for a gender-sensitive CSDP. Nadine Ansorg 
and Toni Haastrup (2018: 1138) find that the EU’s support for security sector reform in 
Ukraine and Afghanistan only considers gender in the form of equal representation within 
EU missions: ‘This is evidence that the EU’s security institutions themselves have not 
implemented gender mainstreaming’.
To date, few scholars have been interested in how CSDP discourses, practices and poli-
cies have been gendered as such – an important exception being Annica Kronsell’s (2016a, 
2016b) work which will be discussed below (cf. Muehlenhoff, 2017). This absence is curi-
ous given that feminists have long demonstrated that security and defence are highly gen-
dered areas of political life (Cohn, 1987; Tickner, 2004). Although this is true for all policy 
areas, more than any other site, security and military institutions shape conceptions of what 
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it means to be or act like a man, linking masculinity to particular traits, such as strength, 
aggression, competitiveness and rationality. R.W. Connell (1983) introduced the concept 
of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ in the 1980s and it has since been taken up by scholars in mul-
tiple ways (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). Building on Connell’s and James W. 
Messerschmidt’s (2005) later work, we conceptualise masculinity in a relational way: ‘pat-
terns of masculinity are socially defined as contradistinctions from some model (whether 
real or imaginary) of femininity’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). Hegemonic 
masculinity subordinates femininity and other types of masculinity in a hierarchical rela-
tionship and ‘embodied the currently most honoured way of being a man, it required all 
men to position themselves in relation to it, and it ideologically legitimated the global 
subordination of women to men’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832). It becomes 
hegemonic by making other masculinities and femininities complicit in a consensus on the 
most valued form of masculinity. However, also other intersections, such as race and class, 
affect hierarchies of masculinities and femininities (Davis, 2008).
Although we mainly look at the discursive expression of hegemonic masculinity, mas-
culinities are also material. For example, in the case of men’s violence, ‘[w]hat “vio-
lence” is and what “violence” means is both material and discursive’ (Hearn, 2014: 9). 
Hegemonic masculinity has material consequences as it allows men’s discursive and 
physical dominance over other men and women (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 
840). Regarding military masculinity, Kimberly Hutchings (2008: 390) writes, ‘The 
standards that govern the being and conduct of men overlap with the standards that gov-
ern the being and conduct of war makers, from foot soldiers to weapons experts to gener-
als and political leaders’. Such conceptions play an important role in the marginalisation 
of women both in war (think sexual violence against women) and ‘at home’ (think care 
work) (Martin De Almagro, 2018). Militarism, masculinities and the everyday depend on 
each other in their discursive and material production.
Yet, feminist work has also complicated the idea that security and defence are linked 
to a particular and one-dimensional understanding of masculinity. Gender constructs are 
complex and change. Claire Duncanson (2009: 71) argues that peacekeeping missions 
may reproduce and redefine ideas of femininities and masculinities by presenting ‘alter-
native military masculinities’. Duncanson studies autobiographical accounts of British 
soldiers involved in peacekeeping in Bosnia in the 1990s to reveal how peacekeepers 
understand and construct their masculinity by ‘claiming that peacekeeping is tougher, 
more dangerous and challenging than war’ and by linking ‘the everyday practices of 
peacekeeping such as building friendships, drinking coffee and chatting’ to ‘bravery and 
effective soldiering’ (Duncanson, 2009: 70). This shows not only how strongly masculin-
ity and military force are intertwined, but also how masculinities evolve when technolo-
gies and strategies of war change (Higate, 2007).
Similarly, the EU does not engage in classical military combat missions but in new 
forms of military engagement including civilian and peacekeeping missions. In this con-
text, new ideas of masculinity and militarism emerge. Kronsell (2016a) argues that CSDP 
is based on different masculinities: ‘A dominant EU hierarchical military masculinity is 
institutionalized in the EU’s Military Committee, combat heterosexual masculinity in the 
Battle groups, and EU protector masculinity in the EU Training missions’ (Kronsell, 
2016a: 311). Kronsell’s (2016a, 2016b) work provides an important starting point for our 
analysis. However, similar approaches to how militarism and military masculinities are 
embedded in and shaping CSDP are still absent. This absence may have to do with a 
strong focus within feminist security and critical military studies on state militaries and 
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on the armed forces of the US and UK in particular (Duriesmith and Ismail, 2019). It is 
also, as discussed, a consequence of the widespread notion that the EU lacks a strong 
military presence, and of a partly unreflective pro-integration bias in EU studies that fails 
to challenge the production of gendered and militarised structures and their consequences 
within the EU.
Our analysis of CSDP shows that protector masculinity, as identified by Kronsell 
(2016a 2016b) in her study of EU training missions, is still prominent, but that combat 
masculinity and entrepreneurial masculinity are becoming increasingly important in the 
current, so-called, times of crisis. Below, we outline these military masculinities and the 
absent/hyper-visible femininities that are constructed alongside them. First, however, we 
analyse how the current ‘times of crisis’ are constituted and how these discursive articula-
tions of crisis are linked to the relaunch of EU security and defence.
The EU as a Masculine Military Actor: Defending and 
Protecting Europe
The latest developments in CSDP are closely linked to a narrative about Europe being 
increasingly vulnerable and facing a variety of threats. On the one hand, the notion of 
Europe being at risk is invoked by the transformation and extension of threat discourses, 
with Europe, as the Global Strategy has it, being presented with a range of ‘new’ chal-
lenges, including ‘terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility and 
energy security’ (EU, 2016: 18–19). On the other hand, these concerns are joined with a 
renewed focus on conventional threats, particularly a ‘resurgent’ Russia. While the 
European Security Strategy of 2003 stated that ‘Europe as never been so prosperous, so 
secure nor so free’ (EU, 2003: 1), the Global Strategy by comparison stresses that:
We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under 
threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, 
is being questioned. To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism 
and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself (EU, 2016: 7).
The current crisis is an ‘existential’ one in the sense that it undermines the current 
world order and Europe’s role as a global power, yet the sources of that same crisis are 
considered to be located mostly outside of Europe’s reach. A promotional video for the 
Global Strategy puts it as follows: ‘When Europe’s region is unstable, terrorist groups can 
spread, our economies get weaker and many people around Europe are forced to flee their 
homes’ (EEAS, 2017a). Insecurity in this view comes from aggressive ‘others’, often 
presented and imagined as brown men (EEAS, 2017a). This gendered and racialised diag-
nosis of crisis prevents the EU from considering other causes of insecurity, such as the 
EU’s border policy or its own economic and monetary policies.
The crisis narrative further spurs a sense of urgency to intervene swiftly. This is trans-
lated into new demands for a more ‘realistic’ Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
which the Global Strategy defines as ‘principled pragmatism’ (EU, 2016: 9), and a more 
militarised and masculine CSDP. As Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker pointed 
out in his 2016 State of the Union speech, ‘even though Europe is proud to be a soft power 
of global importance’, it should not ‘be naïve’, as ‘soft power is not enough in our increas-
ingly dangerous neighbourhood’ (European Commission, 2016). Juncker reiterates the gen-
dered discourse constituting the EU as too soft and naïve, or, as Kagan (2002) once put it, 
8 Political Studies Review 00(0)
as coming from Venus, thereby devaluing specific traits that are associated with femininity 
and reaffirming that true power is rational, military, and masculine. Elsewhere, the EU 
boasts its strength in hard power by stating that Europe is not just a ‘civilian power’, but that 
it ‘currently deploys seventeen military and civilian operations, with thousands of men and 
women serving under the European flag for peace and security – our own security and our 
partners’’ (EU, 2016: 4). The discursive reference to a flag, under which men (and women) 
serve, evokes highly traditional masculine ideas of militarism that imply men’s bravery and 
loyalty to the homeland. The latter is imagined to be feminine and in need of protection, 
even if a common homeland in the case of the EU is highly contested.
The call for a more militarised CSDP has become stronger since the election of US 
President Donald Trump in November 2016. A few months before, the Global Strategy 
already warned that ‘as Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security’ 
(EU, 2016: 19), meaning that ‘while NATO exists to defend its members [. . .] from 
external attacks, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organised to contribute 
decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when neces-
sary’ (EU, 2016: 19). In a JCMS Annual Review Article of the EU in 2017, Nathalie Tocci 
(2018: 132), Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali and special advisor to HRVSP 
Mogherini wrote:
With the election of Donald Trump to the White House, [. . .] the sheer unpredictability of the 
American security guarantee to Europe woke Europeans from their torpor. In other words, the 
days in which Europeans exclusively took care of soft security while sheltering under the 
transatlantic hard security umbrella are fast fading. Not only can and must the EU enable and 
enhance the ability of Europeans to achieve strategic autonomy through a European Security 
and Defence union, but a strong transatlantic bond in the twenty-first century arguably rests on 
this foundation.
The goal of strategic autonomy in response to the described crisis context is linked to 
a growing commitment among European political leaders to increase defence expendi-
ture. More generally, we see how the supposed need to move beyond soft power has given 
way to the rise of militarism and combat masculinity within CSDP.
Combat and Entrepreneurial Masculinity
State militaries have long been defined by combat masculinity given that ‘[c]ombat mas-
culinity provides the micro-politics of the military organization’s raison d'être, the capacity 
to use violence in an organized way, to kill, maim, or defend’ (Kronsell, 2016a: 322). 
Kronsell has already pointed out how the EU Battlegroups – a rapid reaction force of 1500 
soldiers from the Member States that are on standby for 6 months to respond to emerging 
conflicts and crisis – build on and reproduce warrior-like traits such as strength, aggression 
and competitiveness associated with combat masculinity. However, she also finds that the 
fact that to date the Battlegroups have never been employed shows that ‘combat masculin-
ity is not a dominant masculinity in the CSDP’ (Kronsell, 2016a: 323). Recent develop-
ments suggest that combat masculinity is increasingly central within CSDP.
First, EU Member States appear more willing to employ military force. In 2016, the 
Council reaffirmed its commitment to make use of the Battlegroups in the future because 
‘[i]n a world of predictable unpredictability, reacting fast is at times the only way to react 
effectively’ (EEAS, 2017b). Furthermore, in 2017, the Council agreed to activate the 
hitherto unused mechanism of PESCO to deepen defence cooperation among Member 
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States. According to Mogherini, PESCO involves ‘25 Member States [that] have commit-
ted to join forces on a regular basis, to do things together, spend together, invest together, 
buy together, act together’ (EEAS, 2018a). Once signed, PESCO is binding for the par-
ticipating Member States. It is supposed ‘to jointly develop defence capabilities and make 
them available for EU military operations. This will thus enhance the EU’s capacity as an 
international security actor, contribute to the protection of EU citizens and maximise the 
effectiveness of defence spending’ (EEAS, 2018a).
Second, Member States have shown a clear willingness to increase cooperation in 
military spending in the form of the EDF. Launched in 2017, the EDF will invest approxi-
mately €13 billion for the period between 2021 and 2027 to foster research and develop-
ment (R&D) for armaments and defence equipment (European Commission, 2019). 
According to Elżbieta Bieńkowska, Commissioner for Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs and responsible for the EDF, the EDF is:
yet another important building block to ensure that Europe becomes a stronger security provider 
for its citizens [. . .] so that Europe benefits from cutting-edge, interoperable defence technology 
and equipment in novel areas like artificial intelligence, encrypted software, drone technology 
or satellite communication (European Commission, 2019).
The EDF is presented as a key enabler of military force and of the deployment of Member 
States’ military forces. It clearly exhibits references to combat masculinity, to the extent 
that civil society and scholars have warned that the EDF will lead to the militarisation of 
previously strictly civilian EU research funding (cf. European Network Against the Arms 
Trade (ENAAT), 2016), and fundamentally challenges ‘the nature of the European Union 
(EU) as a peace project’ (Csernatoni and Martins, 2019).
At the same time, the fact that the EDF institutionally sits with the Directorate General 
for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs demonstrates that combat mas-
culinity is not uncontested among Member States. Arguably, the specific institutional 
setting of the EDF and the strategy chosen (funding military R&D rather than buying 
weapons directly) is related to the fact that many Member States continue to favour an 
intergovernmental approach to CSDP and a more civilian role for the EU. In this context, 
the Commission has been emphasising the need for a more competitive and innovative 
defence industry, as well as its own competence and expertise as a market-shaping power 
to make this happen (Hoijtink, 2014). The Commission also relies on increased coopera-
tion with major defence corporations and European weapons manufacturers to lobby 
Member States.
Accordingly, the EDF not only legitimises and sustains militarism by linking it to eco-
nomic growth, competitiveness and innovation, but it also relies on and reproduces alterna-
tive masculinities associated with economic prowess, rationality, technological capacity 
and entrepreneurship. Like warfare, work, business and the economy have long been asso-
ciated with masculinity: ‘‘masculine’ qualities such as rational thinking, competitiveness 
and self-control were judged as best suited to the public sphere including political and eco-
nomic activity’, whereas ‘feminine’ qualities were judged as most appropriate for the 
domestic sphere (Hamilton, 2013: 94). As Carol Cohn (1987) has famously argued in her 
research on US ‘defence rationals’, entrepreneurial masculinity is particularly strongly val-
ued among policy-makers in defence. In today’s discussions about the EDF, however, we 
see a clear desire to capitalise on military applications of innovations in the civil domain, 
including big data analytics, artificial intelligence and blockchain technology and to imitate 
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entrepreneurial masculinities associated with engineering, coding and ‘tinkering’ that 
appear so central to the success of Silicon Valley and tech companies such as Google.
Protector Masculinity
While combat and entrepreneurial masculinities are on the rise within CSDP discourse 
and practice, EU military operations are often still legitimised through the need for pro-
tection. Protector masculinity dominates CSDP training missions, as Kronsell (2016a) 
showed, but it is also visible in other CSDP initiatives, such operation EUNAVFOR MED 
Sophia, which aims at the ‘disruption of the business model of human smugglers and traf-
fickers’ in the Mediterranean Sea by deploying military vessels and by training the Libyan 
coastguard in this task (Council of the European Union, 2017: 61). While the mission’s 
core mandate is to fight organised crime (normally a police/civilian task), EU policy dis-
course has emphasised that Sophia prevents the loss of lives at sea. Since 2019, after 
mounting pressure from the Italian government, operation Sophia has been reformed and 
downscaled. Currently, it conducts surveillance operations to deter human smugglers but 
no longer deploys military vessels, relying instead on air patrols and closer cooperation 
with the Libyan authorities. Human rights organisations have sharply criticised these 
developments, emphasising that this is ‘an outrageous abdication of EU government 
responsibilities’ that has ‘nothing to do with the needs of people who risk their lives at 
sea’ (Amnesty International, 2019). Although human rights organisations generally sup-
ported the rescue mandate of the operation and are themselves affected by the latest crim-
inalisation of search and rescue activities, they have also been critical of operation Sophia 
because of the collaboration with Libyan authorities and its implicit goal to deter migra-
tion (Campbell, 2019). In fact, Politico revealed that an internal EEAS report admits that 
the EU itself knew ‘that a number of its policies have made the sea crossing more danger-
ous for migrants’, for example, because Libyan coastguards trained by the EU are ‘col-
laborating with smuggling networks’, or because smugglers now use small and more 
dangerous rubber boats since the EU destroyed their wooden ones (Campbell, 2019).
The leaked report stands in stark contrast to how the EU features operation Sophia in 
one of the promotional videos launching the Global Strategy. This video, which we under-
stand as an attempt by the EEAS to define itself, portrays military force as necessary to 
rescue women and children. The reference to ‘women and children’ is a widely used 
gendered trope that feminists have problematised because it legitimises war and strips 
women off agency by reducing them to mothers in need of protection (cf. Sjoberg and 
Peet, 2011). The EU video tells the story of baby Sophia who was saved by an EU mili-
tary vessel and born on a European military ship ‘after human smugglers almost made her 
mother drown’ (EEAS, 2017c). The storyline produces images of EU protector masculin-
ity in relation to non-Western femininities marked by motherhood, victimhood and weak-
ness, while it presents the masculine ‘other’ (human traffickers and smugglers with 
‘shabby boats’ (EEAS, 2017c)) as dangerous to these women and the EU. The video 
further depicts a male white and a female white EU soldier providing training to a group 
of male Libyan coastguards (EEAS, 2017c), reproducing gendered and racialised hierar-
chies. The representation of the gender-equal EU soldiers signifies the EU’s liberal demo-
cratic character in relation to the ‘other’, in this case Libya, who is supposed to learn how 
to do proper migration and population management.
Although the narrator of the video tells us that this is a ‘story with a happy ending’, she 
does not reveal what happened next to Sophia and her mother and why refugees have to 
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risk their lives to come to Europe (EEAS, 2017c). The EU presents militarism in migra-
tion policies not only as the most rational but also as the most humane thing to do because 
it supposedly protects migrants, especially women and children. The video omits that 
protector masculinity and militarism go hand in hand with the EU’s externalisation of 
migration policies and the suspension of EU norms and standards (cf. Bialasiewicz, 
2012). Furthermore, the video does not mention that EUNAVFOR MED has the military 
objective of contributing to ‘the return of stability and security in Libya and to maritime 
security in the Central Mediterranean region’ (Council of the European Union, 2019).
Protector masculinity is also visible in Mogherini’s proposal for an EPF, a new fund of 
initially €10.5 billion for the next 7 years, replacing the Athena mechanism and the African 
Peace Facility (APF) (EEAS, 2018b). Whereas the Athena mechanism financed CSDP mili-
tary operations, the APF was funded through the European Development Fund, supporting 
the African Union and the African Regional Economic Communities in peace and security 
policies. The latter was explicitly not allowed to provide financial resources for ‘military 
equipment, arms, ammunition or military training’ although it supported military peace sup-
port operations of African partners. The EPF will take this to a global scale and is explicitly 
supposed to provide funds to non-EU partners for them to buy military equipment. The 
EEAS legitimises this move by claiming that ‘[d]evelopments in Europe’s neighbourhood 
and beyond are a constant reminder that our security is not free’ (EEAS, 2018b), reproduc-
ing the US military’s slogan ‘our freedom is not free’ that suggests that we need militarism 
for security at home (Wibben, 2018: 138). The EPF is a way to become more of a ‘hard 
power’, which is needed because ‘[. . .] sometimes quick and decisive military action is 
required first and foremost to save lives and prevent further conflict. Hard power has to 
complement soft power’ (EEAS, 2018b). Moreover, the EEAS states that ‘[h]elping to pre-
vent or contain conflict in our neighbourhood is a safe way to increase security for Europe 
and its citizens’ (EEAS, 2018b). Peace organisations have called on the Council to stop the 
EPF and to ‘avoid investing in militarised approaches that are prone to failure and risk’ 
(Care International et al., 2019). The EPF will also increase funds for military operations 
facilitating the employment of the EU Battlegroups discussed above (EEAS, 2018b).
In all these ways, protector masculinity is at the centre of EU militarism, sustaining 
and legitimising military force to protect European citizens from insecurity abroad, or to 
save women and children abroad from dangerous men. The EU, in this sense, can be seen 
to pursue a form of liberal militarism, which relies on racialised, classed and gendered 
ideas of the other and presupposes that militarism is the ‘‘rational’ course of action’ 
(Basham, 2018: 34).
Absent and Hyper-visible Femininities
Looking at EU promotional material on PESCO, the Battlegroups and the EDF, we do not 
see any women. Women are absent from the text and from visuals. There are pictures of 
male soldiers and of military equipment on the factsheet of the Battlegroups (EEAS, 
2017b). The online news publication on EPF features an image of male African soldiers 
saluting a male white EU officer. The pictures show how EU military masculinity is 
respected and how the EU teaches others to provide security for themselves, in turn pro-
ducing security for Europe (EEAS, 2018b). Although mostly absent, women are imagined 
as the ones to be protected because they are vulnerable and innocent. This becomes visible 
where CSDP material does mention and show women. In these instances, women become 
hyper-visible through the EU’s construction of vulnerable and racialised femininities of 
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motherhood and victimhood, except in the case of the very few female EU soldiers pre-
sented (EEAS, 2017c). So, femininities are largely marked by a lack of agency, whereas 
men are shown as active providers of security for women and the homeland.
Considering the feminist question of ‘whose security’ militarism is protecting and 
defending, the EU conveys that it is protecting European citizens from threats outside 
its borders and saving women and children abroad from dangerous men. However, we 
know that:
war and militarism have generated insecurity in a variety of forms – physical, gendered, food 
and health insecurity [. . .] – through direct physical violence [. . .] and the attendant strategies 
thereof [. . .] that have effects that are then labelled as security problems [. . .] (Stavrianakis and 
Stern, 2018: 5).
Militarism hinders the consideration of local contexts and structural causes of insecurity. 
It also reduces resources for other public investments at home and abroad, such as social 
security (Basham, 2018). Militarism (as a response to crisis) thus reinforces causes and 
consequences of crises rather than transforming them.
To conclude, the above discussion shows that the reforms of CSDP normalise milita-
rism and associated military masculinities through various new initiatives and the discur-
sive articulations of crisis surrounding them. We suggest that the EU builds on previous 
initiatives to strengthen its military power based on combat, entrepreneurial and protector 
masculinities. The EU justifies militarism through gendered and racialised references to 
security without asking questions about the effects thereof, especially for women. 
Meanwhile, it is creating an increasing number of policy nexuses between security and 
defence and other areas such as development (visible in the EPF) and migration (visible 
in operation Sophia) (cf. Allwood, 2019). Future research should analyse these policy 
linkages, how militarism is part of them and how it is legitimised by discourses that mar-
ginalise femininities and centre military masculinities.
Conclusion
We began our discussion by developing two related points regarding EU security and 
defence. First, empirically, we found that against the background of a widespread sense 
of crisis in the EU and in international politics, the EU’s Heads of States have increased 
their cooperation in security and defence. Second, theoretically and analytically, we took 
issue with the way in which the academic literature on CSDP has often taken a prescrip-
tive stance, which combines the shared analysis that the EU lacks military actorness with 
the normative statement that the EU should develop military capabilities. Drawing on 
feminist security and critical military studies, we have argued that the EU should be con-
sidered as a masculine military actor, constituted and shaped by protector masculinity, 
and, also, increasingly, entrepreneurial and combat masculinity. While the presence of 
militarism within CSDP and European politics more broadly is not a new development, 
the crisis discourse that we have analysed allows for the further advancement of milita-
rism and the militarised masculinities associated with it, and for the normalisation of the 
use and/or funding of military equipment and employment in other policy areas, such as 
migration or development. This normalisation of military power and military masculini-
ties beyond the military domain proper and its consequences for people’s (in)securities 
requires further attention within academia and beyond.
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